ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Insiders' Ownership (INS-OWN) means that how much percentage of total shares is held by the management and directors of a corporation. If the management have more monetary stake in a corporation they will work more for betterment and prosperity of the corporation. (VOF) means that, the performance of a corporation in response to maximizing shareholders wealth.
It is the key feature of corporation that, control is separated from the ownership. Ownership is staggered among different shareholders. And control of the firm lies in the hands of management, which causes agency problem.
The agency theory suggests that the management is trying to achieve their own benefits rather than to work for achieving the shareholders benefits and objectives. It is quite possible that management will work for own interest at primary level and shareholders interest are kept at secondary level.
Sometime management are taking steps/decisions which maximize the size of firm and in result their incentives are raised, rather than maximizing of shareholders wealth. In order to avoid agency problem it is proposed that management should have some stockholding in corporation. Pattanayak (2008) , quoted in his research the quotations of two Indian big giant chairmen, which reproduced below "TATA group chairman Mr. Ratan Tata said in press, "the steel industry is fragmented and considerably vulnerable. The only safeguard is to increase the founding family's stake over time; the increase in stake is to ensure that management control remains with promoters". And Bajaj Group chairman Mr. Rahul Bajaj held, "more than 75 percent of large listed Indian companies are family owned, in which a family has a significant shareholding in the company. Companies where management has little or no stake in the company constitute less than 5 percent of the large, listed companies. In a company managed by owners, there is a very strong motivation for managements to work for a long term share price increase." Management and shareholders are two separate parties in corporation having their own separate expectations and interests. Management wants to get maximum incentives and benefits and the shareholders want to maximize their wealth. To overcome this problem and make these interests parallel to each others, it is suggested by the researchers that management should have some stockholdings in a corporation.
When the management has some stockholding interest rather than their incentives and perks they will ultimately work for the betterment and growth of the corporation. And parallel to their incentives and benefits they will also think and work for maximizing of shareholders wealth. The INS-OWN is a base for alignment of interest of shareholders and management. Berle and Means (1932) , suggested in their book "separation of ownership from control" that there are many problems attached with the separation of ownership from control. So it is concluded that greater the ownership, greater the interest. According to them the relation between ownership and firm performance is positive. Jenson and Meckling (1976) , presented the agency theory, which suggests that management is giving preference to fulfill their own interest rather than the interests of shareholders. As and when the ownership of management increases in a corporation then they are more concerned with the increase in shareholder's value and thus management ownership is positively correlated to VOF.
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
If we apply Miller and Modigiliani (1958) , irrelevance theory to corporate ownership structure we can say that there is no relation between firm performance and ownership structure.
Significance of the Study
Performance of corporation is playing a vital role in promotion and demotion of a country economy. Role of corporation become more significant and its impact become more severe upon the emerging economy. Realizing the importance of corporation's performance researchers are studying every aspect which influencing the performance of a corporation.
Pakistan's economy is an emerging economy. Impact of corporation's performance is as significant 
Research Objectives
Based on the above research questions the objectives of the research will be; i.
To know about the direction of correlation between INS-OWN and VOF.
ii.
To know about the magnitude of correlation between INS-OWN and VOF. 
LITERATURE REVIEW

Positive Relation between Vof and Insider Ownership
Selarka (2005), investigated through the relationship of VOF to insider ownership. In his research he examined this relation with groups and stand alone firms. He found that, there is a strong curvilinear U shaped relation exists between VOF and management ownership. He reported that when the INS-OWN is low (of the group) firm holding and (in standalone) firms the INS-OWN is much bigger when relation between VOF and management ownership is positive. He also reported that low and high outside block holding is positively correlated to VOF and this relation turn strongly negative at the moderate level of ownership by outside block holders (a group of shareholders having shares in blocks but they no involvement in the managerial matters of corporation). Kaserer and Moldenhauer (2007) conducted their research and got evidences from German firms.
They found that ownership structure is an exogenous variable at least in case of Germany. They report that the relation between ownership structure and VOF is positive. They also report that outside block shareholdings is positively correlated to VOF.
Kumar (2003), tested the hypothesis "Does ownership structure influence the value of firm". For testing this hypothesis he took the sample of 2478 firms listed at BSE (India) for the period 1994 to 2000. He found that, there is no relation between the ratio of foreign shareholding in domestic firms and their performance. His study concluded that institutional investor influence VOF and its performance positively. He also concluded that INS-OWN effect VOF positively when it crossed beyond a certain level. He also suggested that ownership structure is not independent variable.
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), conducted a study to investigate the relationship between VOF and management ownership. They constructed two equations, in first equation they took VOF as dependent variable and management ownership is as independent variable in a set of some other variables and in the second equation management ownership as a dependent variable and VOF as independent variable in a set of some other variable. For equation-1 they found that VOF is dependent on management ownership and large block holders, but it's relation to management ownership is positive and negative to large block holders. In support of equation-2 they stated that management ownership ratio is strongly affected by VOF. They also report that impact of VOF is more significant on INS-OWN than block holders.
Negative Correlation between Vof and Insider Ownership
Farooq, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2007) , investigated the relationship between VOF and ownership structure through getting evidences from Bangladesh firms. In their research they illustrated that INS-OWN is not independent, but it is dependent on some other variable like VOF and firm performance. They found that ownership structure has no significant impact on VOF but VOF (Tobin's Q) influence ownership structure negatively significantly. After examining the relation between ownership structure, INST-OWN and firm performance they found that, INST-OWN and firm performance is positively correlated to each other. They also found that non executive directors have no influence on firm performance.
Lins and Lemon (2001) profitability as well as the INS-OWN ratio is negatively correlated with debt to equity ratio. But the Institutional Ownership is positively correlated to debt-to-equity ratio which is statistically insignificant. And when they examined the size and profitability with debt-to-equity, they found that profitability is negatively correlated with debt-to-equity ratio whether size of the firm is positively correlated to debt-to-equity ratio. After studying this research paper it is concluded that there is an inverse relation between VOF and insiders ownership, because with the introducing of debt into firm capital structure VOF can be increased. Their research paper stated that the "On the other hand managerial ownership with debt-to-equity ratio indicating that concentration of ownership induces the managers to lower the gearing level". Shahid (2003) , examine the relationship of management ownership to the VOF and stock market performance by using the data from Egypt. Accounting measures of performance are used as a proxy for VOF i.e. ROA and ROE. The researcher found that there is no significant relation between management ownership and ROA/ROE of the firm. It found that there is no relation between stock market performance and insider ownership. The author suggested that there must be some other economic factors which affects share price.
No Relation between Vof and Ins-Own Fraction
Positive Relation at Low Level and High Level and Negative Relation at Moderate Level of Ins-Own
Lopez-Iturriaga and Rodriguez-Sanz (2001) They also found that size of firm is negatively correlated to VOF.
Positive Correlation at Low Level and Negative at High Level of Ins-Own Proportion
Han ( 
Negative Correlation at Low Level and Positive at High Level of Ins-Own Proportion
Lins and Lemmon (2001) 
Variables of Interest
As already mentioned INS-OWN means that, the percentage of shares held by directors (executives and non executives), CEO, managers and their spouse and minor children. For this purpose this paper categorized INS-OWN into three categories and assigning label to each variable which represent insider ownership.
i. INS-1= Where the total fraction of shares held by directors (executive and non executive), CEO, managers and their spouse and minor children, ranging from zero percent to 25%.
ii. INS-2= Where the total fraction of shares ranging from 25.1% to 50%.
iii. INS-3= Where the total fraction of shares are more than 50%.
Metric of Performance
There is no specific metric for measuring the performance of firm. Hence different scholars have used different metrics as performance measurement. In consistency to Pattanayak (2008) , Lins and Lemmon (2001) and Torre, Hidaldo and Pindado (2003) , this research is also using Tobin's Q ratio as a metric for measuring performance of corporations. Tobin's Q ratio is, multiplying market price of shares into total numbers of shares and divided by total assets value.
METHODS
Following Pattanayak (2008) .069400 *. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. Table 3a shows mean Q ratio of INS-1, 0.6305 and 0.3036 respectively, which demonstrated that the mean of the first category is greater than the other two categories. Similarly the mean of the second category is greater than the third. Table 3b 
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is used to analyze the impact of ownership structure (INS-OWN) on firm performance (VOF).
Table-4. Model Summary of Regression Analysis
Classification of correlation's magnitude i.e. R: R value ranging from 0-0.2 is termed as weak.
R value ranging from 0.21-0.5 is termed as moderate.
R value ranging from 0.51-1.00 is termed as high. In regression analysis ANOVA is used to check the fitness of regression model. Mean comparison analysis shows that mean Q ratio of firms in which insider owners have up to 25% shareholding is greater than the Q ratio of firms where INS-OWN is ranging from 25.1% to 50%. And mean Q ratio of firms in which insiders have ownership stake ranging from 25.1% to 50% is higher that the mean Q ratio of firms where insiders have ownership rights 50.1% and above. After studying the mean comparison analysis it is concluded that, as the INS-OWN stockholding increases the mean Q ratio decreases, which is a sign of negative correlation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
Negative correlation between INS-OWN and VOF reveals that as the insider owner's stockholding appreciates VOF depreciates. This is because at the low level of insider owner's stockholding the sword of takeover and replacement is hanging upon their heads. Due to the fear of takeover and replacement they are using corporate resources more efficiently.
Results of regression analysis are also showing a negative correlation between INS-OWN and VOF, as the sign of the beta value is negative. Furthermore this correlation is weak, as R value is less than 0.20. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for Policy Makers
According to this research ideal proportion of INS-OWN is up to 25%. As the ratio of INS-OWN goes up threat of takeover and replacement slashed. Then they are using corporate resource for their own benefits rather than corporate benefits. And the individual shareholders are exploited.
Keeping this in view there should be strong amplifications of rules and new rules may be implemented to protect small shareholders. So the policy makers make it sure that INS-OWN ratio do not exceed the ideal position of INS-OWN as mentioned in this research.
Recommendations for Futuristic Research
Value of R squared shows that 2.3% change in VOF is due to INS-OWN which is a low amount.
Furthermore the correlation is also weak. So it is concluded that VOF is not affected only by INS-OWN but there are some other variables which affect VOF. It is suggested that affect of INS-OWN may be tested with an addition of some other variables. The INS-OWN blocks made in this research having excessive intervals .i.e. 0-25%, 25.1%-50% and 50.1% and above. It is recommended that for futuristic research intervals in INS-OWN blocks may be reduced. Because with the more of INS-OWN blocks, the more accurate results regarding ideal proportion of insider's stockholding will be obtained.
